Fictitious Coercion: BDSM Practices and the Negotiation of Narrative Temporality in Transparent by Aguilar Balbuena, Emilio
Graduate Journal for the Study of Culture // No. 2 - 2nd Series // April 2020
Fictitious Coercion: BDSM Practices and the Negotiation of 
Narrative Temporality in Transparent




When tracing the ethical implications of the concept of sexual consent, difficulties arise
when  our  analysis  relies  on  essentialist  claims  about  what  constitutes  safe/risky  sex
practices. Such claims can be said to stem from heteronormative discourses and practices
that determine the way people relate to each other, both in time and space. In this paper, I
conduct a temporal analysis of two scenes that represent modes of interpersonal relations
that  complicate  neoliberal  normativity.  By  shifting  the  consent  debate  away  from  the
overdetermined  field  of  sexual  politics  and  into  questions  of  intersubjectivity  and
temporality in narrative, I hope to expand the work that the concept of consent can do. 
My first object of study is a scene from the TV series Transparent (2014-present),
created by Jill Soloway for Amazon Studios. In its third season, Sarah Pfefferman (Amy
Landecker), the daughter of the main character of the series, explores BDSM practices –
ritualized exchanges of power – with a professional dominant practitioner, or 'pro-dom'6,
called Pony (played by the gender-queer porn star Jiz Lee).  In the episode "Just the Facts"
written by Jill Soloway and directed by Silas Howard, Sarah attends what will turn out to be
their last session together. On this occasion, Sarah decides she wants to 'top' Pony – that
is, she wants to 'switch' roles and be the 'dom'. Pony accepts and proceeds to make a
"quick verbal contract", stating that they have "hard limits" and that their safe word is "red".
The session does not go well: Sarah quickly loses control and Pony has to use their safe
word not once but three times less than a minute into the scene, as Sarah seems to have
become unable to hear Pony. The scene is short but very powerful. Despite being scripted,
6In BDSM terminology, the person who plays the dominant role ("dom") is also refers as the "top", while the
one playing the submissive role ("sub") is the "bottom".
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there is something particular about the way violence is framed in this scene which seems
to interrupt the temporality of the fiction. In so doing, the spectator's attention is shifted
from the fictional narration to the reality of the performers. Could it be that we become
more aware of the visceral aspects of staged violence and coercion when it takes place in
the context of practices of desire where consent plays a pivotal role? How can the concept
of consent help us understand the negotiations that take place in this scene between the
performance of violence and actual violence?
In this paper I  will  show how both BDSM practices and spectatorship alike are
grounded  in  intersubjective  dynamics  that  can  be  described  in  terms of  consent  and
coercion. Transparent’s representation of a BDSM scene within a fictional narrative causes
spectatorship and practices of consent to interact in a manner that unsettles each other.
The framing of the violence in Transparent interrupts the time of the narration, and reveals
affective elements of the actual bodies and lives of the performers. We witness something
that  feels  too real,  and this makes us wonder whether  we were likewise coerced into
watching something we did not consent to.  I argue that the resulting meta-device, of a
temporal rupture in a fictional narrative, enables the narrative to point at its own temporal
organization, thereby creating space for the spectator to recognize the complex dynamics
that are taking place between them and the narrative. The resulting metafiction shapes an
intersubjective relation between narrative and spectators which I call a fictitiously-coerced
audience.
To construct my argument, I turn to Jessica Benjamin's Beyond Doer and Done to:
Recognition Theory, Intersubjectivity and the Third (2018) in which she develops a theory
of  intersubjective  recognition.  Drawing  on  her  distinction  between  complementary  and
reciprocal  relationships,  I  propose  a  reading  of  BDSM practices  as  the  enactment  or
performance  of  a  relation  of  complementarity  within  the  boundaries  of  a  relation  of
reciprocity. Relations of reciprocity unfold in complex temporalities that are never simply
linear. In order to unpack such temporal complexity, I  draw on Jack Halberstam's  In a
Queer Time and Place (2005) and his concept of 'queer time', Elizabeth Freeman's notion
of 'chrononormativity' as introduced in  “Time Binds, or, Erotohistoriography" (2005),  and
Michel Serres' The Parasite (first published in 1982). Using them, I suggest that queer time
can  be  considered  parasitic  to  hegemonic  narratives  of  time;  it  is  both  included  in
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heteronormative temporality, and yet interrupts it by proposing a different logic. Comparing
Transparent’s scene  to  the  aversion  therapy  scene  in  Stanley  Kubrick's  A Clockwork
Orange (1971),  I  argue  that  both  narratives  instrumentalize  our  vulnerabilities  as
spectators who, lacking the necessary information, can never fully consent to suspend our
disbelief.  While  Kubrick's  scene  achieves  this  by  making  us  witness  actual  violence,
Transparent does so by providing us with the necessary tools to assist us in recognizing
our  own  fictional  coercion,  thereby  enabling  new  and  queer  forms  of  consensual
intersubjectivity to arise.
Pony and Sarah's scene is shown in two parts, each approximately a minute in
length. During the first part, Pony and Sarah have the conversation about switching roles
that leads to the subsequent verbal contract and Pony's safe word. The second part starts
by showing Pony in a submissive position, pants down and hands tied up, ready to be
spanked.  However,  the role-play seems to  end before it  even starts:  Sarah feels self-
conscious and asks Pony: "can I just be me and you be you?" ("Just the Facts" 14:33-
14:35), indicating that she wants to return to their habitual roles. But when Pony answers
"yes, ma'am", Sarah asks to be called "boss" instead. Being called "boss" puts Sarah into
character  and  so,  holding  a  leather  paddle  spanker,  she  starts  threatening  Pony with
hitting them: "where do you think it's gonna hit? you think it might be your ass? maybe I'll
hit  your face, would that  be good? maybe your cunt".  Then she proceeds to hit  them
several times while Pony lets out what sounds like a genuine "ouch". Yet Sarah shows
contempt: "oh, does that hurt?" and gets more aggressive: "shut up stupid fucking twat!"
Sarah then loses control and starts yelling at their face, threatening to kill them, unable to
register Pony's safe word:
Sarah: you know what I should do? I SHOULD BEAT THE SHIT OUT OF YOU, 
THAT'S WHAT I SHOULD DO. I SHOULD FUCKING CUT OFF YOUR FUCKING 
HEAD...
Pony: RED 
Sarah: ...AND PISS DOWN YOUR THROAT...! 
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Pony: RED! 
Sarah: ...YOU UGLY FUCKING CUNT...
Pony: RED!! 
It takes Sarah four seconds to finally hear Pony and stop hitting them. The scene ends
with Sarah panting and looking shocked. This is Pony's last appearance in  Transparent;
after this encounter Pony will  leave town, and despite Sarah's attempts to reach them,
Pony and Sarah will never talk again.
The boundaries between consent and coercion in this scene are framed around
Pony's safe word "red". Before they start role-playing, Pony tells Sarah their safe word,
which can be understood as an illocutionary or  performative speech act  that  declares
Pony’s consent to the role-play7. When Pony utters the safe word during the role-play, the
meaning of the illocutionary act shifts to "I do not consent to this any longer". But Sarah
cannot register Pony's cessation of consent and continues to make use of a power that is
no  longer  consensual.  This  in  turn  opens  up  another  level  of  complexity  that  is  not
resolved until after the final time Pony shouts "RED!" and Sarah stops hitting them. It only
takes Pony's first utterance of the safe word to retract consent and turn the role-play into
coercion. And it takes four seconds for Sarah to stop that coercive violence. My claim is
that something happens during those four seconds in which the trust the characters had
shared is betrayed, that makes the spectator question the very fictionality of the scene.
This questioning is achieved through the narrative’s incorporation of the negotiation of the
role-play into the fictional storyline, and its emphasizing of the betrayal of that contract. 
The resulting meta-device – the exposure of a consensual performance (the role-
play) within a fictional performance (the filmed scene) – discloses the very boundaries of
the fiction in which it is rooted. The sense of hyperreality – in this case, the inability to
clearly distinguish where/when the fiction ends and reality begins – establishes a different
7In the work of John L. Austin (1962), an illocutionary act is an utterance that rather than describing a state of
affairs, actually brings about the very state of affairs that the utterance refers to. In this sense, saying "I
consent" should be understood as an illocutionary act, as it brings about, by way of a convention, the act of
consenting.
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temporality that makes the spectator wonder about the actual bodies of the performers
who are playing the fictional characters. We may inquire whether someone's boundaries
were crossed during the filming of the scene. Certainly, the viewer cannot have access to
such information solely from watching the scene, and yet it is as if by making this instance
of  (non)consent  so  central,  other  instances  of  consent  became  conspicuous  by  their
absence: how did the performers consent to this scene? Did they have another safe word
that they could use in case they wanted to stop filming? Which of the two people acting do
we consider to be in a more vulnerable position, the one playing the ‘bottom' or the 'top'?
We may initially consider the person playing the submissive role to be more vulnerable.
Yet,  this question resists a simple answer once we take into account the fact that the
person playing the submissive role is Jiz Lee, a queer-porn star experienced with BDSM
sexuality, while the dom is Amy Landecker, a TV actress who is a novice in non-normative
sexualities8. This brings me to the argument that the way violence is framed in this scene
seems  to  interrupt  the  storyline  of  the  fictional  narrative  with  the  temporality  of  the
experiences, lives, and bodies of the people performing it.  The spectator’s attention is
suddenly shifted away from the logic of the fiction to that of the reality of the performers.
Even though we can never be sure whether or when someone's boundaries are crossed
during the shooting of a film, this scene brings questions around consent in performance
clearly to the fore.
Before demonstrating how temporality can inform our account of both this scene
and BDSM practices, we first need to examine the dynamics that take place in consensual
and coercive relations. For this I now turn to Jessica Benjamin's theory of intersubjectivity







Also, in another interview (https://www.vulture.com/2017/09/amy-landecker-on-transparent-threesomes-and-
poop.html) Landecker states: "I find rage to be the scariest emotion as an actor, for me personally, to tap 
into. I don’t like anger, and I don’t like conflict particularly in my life".
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Between you and me: Benjamin's Third
Benjamin  writes  that  intersubjectivity  denotes  a  "relationship  of  mutual  recognition"  in
which "each person experiences the other as a 'like subject', another mind who can be 'felt
with',  yet  has  a  distinct,  separate  center  of  feeling  and  perception"  ("Beyond"  5).
Intersubjectivity is characterized by what Benjamin calls the position of the "Third", which
she explains as: 
a position constituted through holding the tension of recognition between difference
and sameness, taking the other to be a separate but equivalent center of initiative and
consciousness with whom nonetheless feelings and intentions can be shared. (Beyond
Doer 4) 
Therefore, the Third is the name given to the intersubjective space between one person
and  another  when  they  are  in  a  relation  of  reciprocity.  In  contrast,  relations  of
complementarity – of 'twoness' – can be described by the dynamics of "push-me/pull-you"
and "does/done-to", in which "dependency becomes coercive" ("Beyond" 9). In relations of
complementarity, "each person feels done to, and not like an agent helping to shape a co-
created reality" (9). The erasure of the in-between intersubjective space leads to one-way
dynamics – in contrast to the two-way streets of thirdness. In complementarity, thus, each
person  struggles  to  gain  the  other's  recognition,  and  each  feels  either  submissive  or
resistant to the other's power – "each perceives the other as 'doing to me'" ("Beyond" 10).
The Third refers to a space between oneself and the other that allows one to feel
related to, but not fully determined by, the other. In this sense, a relation of thirdness is one
in  which  two  people  co-create  a  common  space/narrative.  In  contrast,  a  relation  of
complementarity is one in which people feel that the narrative of the other is being forced
upon them, and thus none of the participants feel they are responding with a sense of
agency and authorship. We could then say that, in the case of thirdness, the fact that the
sense  of  reality  is  co-created  implies  that  both  people  experience  one narrative  as
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including both their senses of reality; whereas in the case of twoness, people experience
their sense of reality as being forced onto them, interrupted by the narrative of the other. 
I propose that the distinction between relations of complementarity and reciprocity
can inform our understanding of practices of consent. It may be clear that abusive relations
are better described by the formal structural pattern of twoness, while consensual ones
relate better to relations of thirdness. Although Benjamin does not speak about consent in
the  context  of  non-normative  sexualities,  I  propose  that  in  order  to  account  for  the
dynamics  that  take  place  during  BDSM,  we  need  to  make  use  of  both  twoness  and
thirdness simultaneously. People who decide to engage in a mutually-agreed practice of
desire that moves beyond the oppositional binary of 'risk' and 'safety' (I will return to this)
do so from a place of thirdness, since they recognize each other as a "separate [yet]
equivalent  center  of  initiative  and  consciousness".  In  this  way,  we could  describe  the
formal  structural  pattern  of  such  role-playing  as  the  negotiation  and  enactment  of  a
relation of twoness within the reciprocity of a relation of thirdness.
The fact that BDSM practices can be explained as the enactment of a relation of
complementarity confined within the boundaries of reciprocity brings us to the question of
agency in narrative.  Feeling coerced implies that one is unable to respond with agency
and authorship within a given relationship; one feels unable to negotiate meaning with the
other. On the contrary, our sense of agency derives from the feeling that our reality is co-
created with others. If a fictional narrative assumes the readers to be passive receivers of
information, we could say that it tries to establish a relation of twoness with them. Yet, if we
as spectators  consent  to  suspend our  disbelief  in  order  to  follow a fictional  logic  and
structure, that is, if  we consent to  what we are being exposed to (i.e.,  either fiction or
nonfiction), we can then consider ourselves to be agents with some freedom to interpret
meaning. But, as we are about to see, the line between fiction and nonfiction is never
clearly  demarcated,  and  as  such  it  is  not  always  tenable  to  claim  this  freedom  of
interpretation.
When  discussing  intersubjective  relations  between  fictional  narratives  and
spectators,  it  becomes evident  that  Benjamin's  theory  does not  take into  account  the
temporal dimension in which relationships unfold. Considering temporal complexity can
allow us to  account  for  the different  ways that  narratives – different  chronologies that
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explain successions of events – can interact with one another: either by interrupting each
other,  collapsing into one another or  folding onto themselves. From within this temporal
frame  we  could  argue  that  what  keeps  a  BDSM  performance  contained  within  the
boundaries of reciprocity – what turns the relation of twoness into a performance – is the
agreement that all parties have the power to decide  when to cease the scene. In other
words, it remains a relationship of thirdness insofar as all the people involved feel they
have agency over the temporal boundaries of the scene of twoness9. It is in this way that
all  people involved in a BDSM scene – both the ones  playing  the submissive and the
dominant roles – negotiate meaning in the relationship.
In  the  case of  Transparent, we should  consider  Pony and Sarah's  role-play  as
unfolding in a threefold temporality, as it is (1) a performance of twoness in (2) a relation of
thirdness,  which takes place within (3)  a fictional narrative. When Sarah threatens to cut
Pony’s head off, Pony senses that the Third may have collapsed, and that Sarah cannot
recognize them as a 'like subject' anymore – that is, she cannot see Pony as a distinct and
separate subject. The four seconds in which Sarah is unable to register Pony's will to stop
the scene evidence this collapsed Third; in that moment, only Sarah has agency over the
temporal  boundaries of their  interaction.  Without a common sense of  time,  Sarah has
assimilated Pony in her own narrative, merging with them into a 'oneness' that eradicates
difference and renders Pony no longer an "equivalent center of initiative"10. Pony realizes
that  the  performance of  twoness  has  become  conflated  with  an  actual relation  of
complementarity, and tries to stop the role-play so as to regain agency. Although all this
still operates within  Transparent’s fictional narrative, the resulting metafiction signals the
spectator to the intersubjective relation they stablish with the narrative – that is, the scene
points at our own position as audience.
Another example of a scene that instrumentalizes our vulnerabilities as spectators
is  the aversion therapy scene in  Kubrick's  A Clockwork Orange (1971).  In  contrast  to
Transparent,  this scene does so by making us witness actual violence.  In this disturbing
scene, Alex (Malcolm McDowell) undergoes a very violent therapy, called the 'Ludovico
9It  would be interesting to apply the concepts of twoness and thirdness to scenes where more than two
people are involved. I believe these concepts can apply not only to individuals, but also to groups.
10This is what Benajmin refers to as the "perversion of the moral third", which "accompanies the kill-or-be-
killed complementarity and marks the absence of recognition of the other’s separateness" ("Beyond" 16).
54
Graduate Journal for the Study of Culture // No. 2 - 2nd Series // April 2020
Treatment', that is intended to help him overcome his own violent behavior. The scene
takes place in  a cinema, where Alex is straitjacketed and his head is  strapped into a
medical device and wired up with electrodes. The therapy consists of pumping him full of
drugs and then forcing him to watch extremely violent footage of a gang beating up a man,
and then another gang raping a woman. From the back of the room, more than 10 doctors
in white coats expressionlessly observe the treatment. Alex's eyes are kept open using lid
locks in such a way that he is not able to blink, look away or in any way interrupt his
viewing of the narrative of violence that he is being exposed to. While a doctor applies
drops on his eyes, we hear Alex's voice-over narrating what is happening to him in the
past tense: "they clamped like lidlocks on my eyes so I could not shut them no matter how
hard I tried. It seemed a bit crazy to me, but I let them get on with what they wanted to get
on with" (71:30-71:41). The use of the past tense emphasizes Alex’s sense of coercion as
he is unable to account for his own experience in that present. After a short while, Alex's
voice-over says he "began" to feel sick. Then, Alex's diegetic body speaks, begging the
doctors to stop the film and give him something to vomit into. Despite his violent retches,
the doctors do not react. 
One common reading of this scene is that it represents the state's use of violence in
penal and medical institutions, in an effort to make the bodies of criminals docile. The
doctors make Alex feel physically sick while exposing him to a linear narrative of what is
considered violence, so that he will associate that narrative with horror and physical pain.
The condition for this therapy/torture to work is thus that Alex has no choice but to be
exposed to "the line of fire" of the footage – to images whose colors, Alex says, look more
real than those of the real world. This last comment together with the fact that this scene is
set  in  a  cinema  function  as  a  meta-comment  that  makes  the  spectator  question  the
complex layers of violence in this scene.
But if we take into account that the doctor who is applying the drops to Alex's eyes
is not simply an actor acting as a doctor, but an actual doctor from Moorfields Eye Hospital
in London, then another reading becomes possible. If we consider that the actor McDowell
really needed those drops in order to keep his eyes open during shooting, then the doctor
and the eye drops become elements that cannot simply be considered 'fictional' – in the
sense that they are not just representations. Even though his eyes were anesthetized,
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McDowell states in an interview that he underwent excruciating pain, and that one of his
corneas got scratched during this scene, almost causing him to go blind11. In light of this,
we have on the one hand the narrative of torture within a film that shows a character being
forced to watch violent footage, and on the other, an actor in pain who is risking his sight in
order to shoot the scene. Even if we did not know the actual risk that McDowell underwent,
seeing  the  actor  in  such  a  vulnerable  situation  makes  us  wonder  about  the  actual
conditions of shooting – just like with Landecker (Sarah) and Lee (Pony) in Transparent,
although in A Clockwork Orange the outcome is far more distressful. This brings me to the
argument that when spectators are prompted to question whether a performance carries
risks of leaving affective or physical marks on the bodies of the performer(s), the fictional
narrative is interrupted by a real one. Insofar as the performers may be compromised by
the fiction they are enacting, performances like this one – with physical implications that
exceed fictional representation – can expose their audience to non-consensual violence.
In light of this, and considering the suffering that McDowell actually underwent, we
realize that this scene, by instrumentalizing the spectators' suspension of disbelief, forces
us to watch  actual violence. We are coerced into the same position as Alex: forced to
watch  violence  to  which  we  did  not  consent.  The  fact  that  McDowell  underwent
'excruciating pain' when acting the role of Alex, implies that the distinction between the
body of the performer and that of the character collapses in this scene. The possibility that
the actor's body is at risk overwrites the fictional time, and thus puts the audience in the
position of the "done to". Therefore, Kubrick's representation of the state's use of violence
is  itself coercive  in  how  it  forces  the  audience  into  Alex's  position. Even  though  I
understand that the scratch in McDowell's cornea was the result of an accident and not of
a coercive relationship, Kubrick's decision to keep the footage in the movie puts the viewer
in a situation in which they think they are watching the performance of suffering (fictional
violence) when the case is otherwise. We may have consented to watch Alex's suffering,
since most people who watch this movie know prior to watching that it portrays violence,
but  have we consented to  watching  McDowell's  suffering? Put  more simply, when we
expect to see the performance of violence/suffering and are instead exposed to actual
violence/suffering, we are being forced into watching something we did not consent to.
Although the boundaries between acting and suffering are permeable,  the question of
11See http://collider.com/malcolm-mcdowell-leon-vitali-interview-a-clockwork-orange/
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when performance turns into violence is a deeply ethical one and, for that reason, should
continuously be (re)considered.
Parasitic Temporalities and Queer Relations
We realize by now that in order to determine whether a relationship can be considered
consensual or not, we need to take into account not only the testimony of two (or more)
individuals, but also, on another level of accountability, the place and time of that relation.
In this way,  the concept of  consent  brings up the challenge of accounting for multiple
temporalities. This is to say that we need conceptual tools that permit us to consider how
different testimonies relate to each other – whether these testimonies interrupt each other
or run in parallel. In an attempt to build a topological account12 of interpersonal relations, I
imagine that the testimonies of the people involved in a consensual relationship (in which
people co-create a sense of reality) run in parallel with each other, never interrupting or
crossing the other (etymologically,  'parallel'  means "besides one another").  Conversely,
coercive  relationships  are  those in  which  people feel  that  someone else's  narrative is
being forced upon them, thus interrupting their sense of reality. A relationship in which
people's  experience  of  reality  interrupt  each  other  is  what  I  consider  a  'parasitic
relationship'. A parasite – etymologically, "the one that eats next to" – obtains something
from someone else, its host, and gives nothing in return, and, I would add, it  does so
without consent. In the case of relations of complementarity, we could argue that the sense
of reality of both individuals is simultaneously parasiting and being parasited upon by the
narrative  of  the  other.  Paralleled  or  parasited,  in  either  case  the  prefix  para- means
‘beside’, ‘near’, and it thus already structures a type of relation.
In The Parasite, Michel Serres explains that a parasite feeds from its host and gives
nothing  in  return.  Therefore,  chains  of  parasitic  relations  create  an  order  that  moves
12In "Topologies: Michel Serres and the Shapes of Thoughts", Steven Connor defines topology as "the study
of the spatial properties of an object that remain invariant under homeomorphic deformation, which is to say,
broadly, actions of stretching, squeezing, or folding, but not tearing or breaking. Topology is not concerned
with exact measurement, which is the domain of geometry, whether Euclidean or non-Euclidean, but rather
with  spatial  relations,  such  as  continuity,  neighbourhood,  insideness  and  outsideness,  disjunction  and
connection."
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always in one direction, like the flow of time: “the chain of parasitism is a simple relation of
order, irreversible like the flow of the river” (182). A system, defined as a pre-existing set of
relations, is not simply vulnerable to parasitic relations. Rather, it is constituted by such
interruptions, since each relation is already the interruption of some previous relation, of
some previously open channel of communication. In this way, a parasite, rather than being
a relation to another entity, is a relation to an already established order. Further, a parasitic
interruption is always productive because it introduces a new order, a different logic. For
Serres, a parasite is "what is between, what exists between. The middle term. The means
and the means to an end. The means and the tool; the tool and its use; the means and the
use" (65). In a parasitic account on subjectivity,  a sense of self  is the by-product of a
previously established relation. In this way, the 'self' is no longer a centralized agent but is
rather  the  result  of  a  relation.  This  complicates  the  categories  of  inside  and  outside,
antecedent and consequent. Thinking in terms of parasitic/parallel relations can thus help
us unpack the temporal complexities of the concepts of consent. 
If  we  understand  intersubjectivity  as  a  system  constituted  by  relations  and
interruptions, we can then explain relations of reciprocity and complementarity as relations
where temporalities either come together or interrupt each other,  respectively.  In other
words, a relation of reciprocity is one that takes place in a temporality that is felt to be co-
created by everyone involved. The temporality of such a relation is thus recognized as a
common realm, belonging simultaneously to everyone and to nobody – as Benjamin writes
in  the  context  of  the thirdness of  attuned play:  "To the question  of  'Who created this
pattern, you or I?', the paradoxical answer is 'Both and neither'" ("Beyond" 18). In contrast,
in a relation of complementarity, people experience the narrative of the relation as being
imposed by the other, in such a way that the relationship unfolds in a temporality that is
parasitic because it interrupts one's own narrative. Serres writes: "If the relation succeeds,
if it is perfect, optimum, and immediate; it disappears as a relation. If it is there, if it exists,
that means that it failed. It is only mediation. Relation is nonrelation. And that is what the
parasite is" (79). Here Serres is arguing that we are only able to experience a relation
when it has somehow failed as one, that is, when it has been interrupted. This seems to
suggest that the time of thirdness, rather than being experienced as being in a relation, is
experience as the relation itself. While the parasitism of complementarity is experienced as
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an interruption  to  a  previously  established  temporality,  the  parallelism of  reciprocity  is
experience as one shared temporality.
Elizabeth  Freeman  coins  the  term  'chrononormativity'  to  refer  to  the temporal
mechanisms  employed  by  neoliberal  societies  to  organize  individual  bodies  toward
maximum  productivity.  These  mechanisms  produce  sequential  forms  of  time  that  are
constructed  around  concepts  such  as  family,  marriage,  heredity  and  generationality.
Together, these form a historical, heteronormative narrative of belonging and becoming.
Jack Halberstam  argues that "Hegemonic constructions of time and space are uniquely
gendered  and  sexualized"  (8);  i.e.,  heteronormativity  organizes  the  interpersonal
experience  of  people  both  in  time  and  space.  For  Halberstam "queer"  refers  to
"nonnormative logics and organizations of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and
activity  in  space and time"  (6). "Queer time"  is  thus constituted by  specific  models of
temporality that emerge within postmodernism when the temporal "frames of bourgeois
reproduction  and  family,  longevity,  risk/safety,  and  inheritance"  (my  emphasis  6)  are
resisted. We can therefore say that normative sexualities result from narratives of time that
establish  a  sequential  temporal  order  following  the  logic  of  chrononormativity.  This
organization of subjective interrelations not only determines the kinds of relationships we
create with others, but also the quality of the intimacy that we are able to access. In this
regard, consensual non-normative sexualities can be viewed as a set of practices that, by
renegotiating the normative sites where intimacy and intersubjectivity are nurtured, have
the potential to interrupt the prescriptive temporal order of neoliberal lifestyles . In other
words, queer time can be said to function as a parasitic interruption to the hegemonic,
heteronormative narrative of time, from which new kinds of intersubjective consensuality
can arise.
In the community around BDSM there are different views on the binary of 'risk' and
'safety'. "Safe, sane and consensual" (SSC) became a slogan for a US BDSM scene in the
early 80's. However, around the 2000's a new kind of ethos came about in opposition to
SSC: "Risk-Aware Consensual Kink" (RACK)13. This alternative asserts the right to engage
in activities that may be considered 'risky', as long as the people involved are aware of the
13For discussions on SSC and RACK see: https://xcbdsm.com/educational-offerings/handouts-and-  
resources/ssc-vs-rack/, http://www.leathernroses.com/generalbdsm/medlinssc.htm and 
https://epochryphal.wordpress.com/2015/02/16/rack-vs-ssc-kink-consent-ableism-agency/
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risks and are willing to accept them. RACK (also known as 'edgeplay') critiques SSC for
using subjective terms like 'safe' and 'sane' to define a practice, arguing that this reifies
authorities  who  decide  what  'safe'  or  'unsafe'  play  means.  Instead,  RACK  puts  the
responsibility of risk management on the individual by foregrounding the fact that all sexual
activity  carries  a  degree  of  risk.  In  so  doing,  RACK challenges  the  binary  opposition
between 'risk' and 'safety'. Lisa Downing writes: "wanting something dangerous despite or
because of the lack of a guaranteed safety clause could be a valid version of an ethics of
pleasure" (original emphasis "Beyond Safety", 123). Practices of pleasure that dissociate
from the binary of risk/safety can thus breach the established temporal order. Therefore,
logics of pleasure in which risk is desirable – and thus control over safety is given up –
unfold in a queer time that parasites chrononormativity. 
The suspension of  disbelief  that  is  necessary to follow a fictional  narrative also
carries risks for the spectator. When we consent to suspend our disbelief, we agree to
enter  into  an  intersubjective  relation  with  the  narrative.  When  looking  at  Transparent
through  the  frame  of  parasitic  temporalities,  we  can  distinguish  two  distinct  temporal
interruptions  taking  place  in  this  scene:  (1)  chrononormativity  is  interrupted  by  the
representation of  a  non-normative  practice  of  desire  where pleasure is  exchanged for
money and the oppositional binary between 'risk' and 'safety' is challenged. When the role-
play becomes non-consensual, (2) the queer temporality that had just started is abruptly
interrupted. This begins, in turn, another distinct temporal account which I call  fictitious
coercion. This scene thus brings forward two distinct levels of intersubjective relations with
the spectator, which I represent in the following way:
(1) [[BDSM in Transparent] within chrononormativity]
(2) [[[BDSM scene] within Transparent] within chrononormativity]  
In the first case, the BDSM scene is the parasite of chrononormativity, which means
that the fictional narrative of Transparent is not interrupted, and thus still functions as an
end in itself; whereas in the second case, the BDSM scene is a parasite to Transparent’s
fictional narrative. In the later case, the role-play turns the fiction into a medium – rather
than  an  end  –  through  which  the  director  initiates  an  intersubjective  relation  with  his
spectator.  As  mentioned  above,  narratives  have  the  potential  to  either  co-create
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temporalities with their spectators or assimilate them into an already established reality.
With the performance of a BDSM scene that parasites an already fictional narrative, the
director Silas Howard makes clear that for a narrative to parasite the time of the spectator,
it needs their consensual suspension of disbelief. In this scene, Howard queers time by
bringing to the fore the multiple temporalities unfolding between the time of the narration
and our own lived temporalities. 
This brings me to the argument that Transparent’s fictional narrative, by showing the
negotiation of played roles in a BDSM practice, alludes to the very parasitic temporality it
establishes with the audience. Gesturing at the complexity of the temporal organization of
its performance,  this scene establishes an intersubjective time in which it surrenders to
being with (parallel to) the spectators. Benjamin writes that in relations of complementarity,
one can recover subjectivity by recognizing one’s own participation in the relation, that is,
by  surrendering to  the  principle  of  'reciprocal  influence'  in  interaction  ("Beyond"  11).
Surrendering  implies "freedom from any intent  to  control  or  coerce"  ("Beyond"  9)  and
requires a "certain letting go of the self, and thus implies the ability to take in the other's
point of view or reality" ("Beyond" 8). In Transparent, the moment of surrender coincides
with the four seconds of hyperreality during which the viewer can disengage from the
complementarity of the fiction and look through, as it were, into a reality that includes both
the spectators'  and the performers'  subjectivities. This is achieved by incorporating the
discourse/practice of consent, that functions as a meta-device that both stems from and
reflects on the performance of a BDSM scene within the boundaries of a fiction. This meta-
device functions as a (meta-)parasite that is able to comment on its own parasitism. In
other words, the scene manages to bring forward the very dynamics it establishes with the
spectators by synchronizing (putting in  parallel) the time of the narrative with that of the
BDSM meta-narrative. The scene thus manages to establish, for a limited time, a relation
of  thirdness with  the  spectator  by  recognizing and showing how the  temporal/fictional
structure from which it borrows is founded on the very parasitic relation that it seeks to
represent. By doing so, the narrative of this scene creates a common temporality with the
spectator, a relation of reciprocity in which the spectator feels recognized and is thus free
to negotiate  meaning.  This  brings us back to  questions of  consent  and spectatorship:
when exposed to a narrative, do we feel free to negotiate meaning together with it, or, do
we feel coerced into having to agree with it?
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Conclusion: Responsibility and Consensual Suspension of Disbelief
This  brings  me  to  the  conclusion  that  narratives  construct  audiences  through  the
spectators'  consensual  suspension of  disbelief.  An audience,  in  this  sense,  should  be
understood  as  the  relationship  that  narratives  establish  with  spectators.  The  fact  that
narratives compromise spectators in constructing audiences raises questions about the
responsibilities  and  ethics  of  narratives.  Considering  that  narrators  make  stories  for
spectators that  are not  yet present,  and that suspending disbelief  carries the risk that
spectators may witness actual violence, I ask: can violence be responsibly represented in
fiction? 
I  propose that an ethical  narrator is one who is aware of the risks to which an
audience is exposed, and uses that awareness to construct the chronology of their story.
When the  vulnerabilities  of  the  audience are  brought  into  the  narrative,  without  being
instrumentalized, the narration can then represent violence without itself performing it. In
this way, an ethical narrator is one that is not afraid of exposing the fictionality in which
their story is rooted, because their narration operates not only at the level of representation
but also at one of intersubjectivity. Therefore, the question of responsibility resides less in
the  content  of  the  narrative  and more  in  the  relationship  that  that  narrative  uncovers
discursively.  As we have seen, the fictional depiction of violence in  Transparent and  A
Clockwork Orange interrupts the narrative of the fiction, thus alluding to other layers of
temporality in which the reality of both the actors and the spectators are included. It is
partially through this interruption that violence is represented. By uncovering the previously
hidden parasitic temporality in which the fictional narrative is rooted, these scenes  bring
problematic questions around consent in performance clearly to the fore. 
However,  A  Clockwork  Orange  instrumentalizes  the  spectators'  suspension  of
disbelief by making us witness actual violence, while  Transparent coerces the spectator
only fictitiously. In Transparent, we become attuned to the violence as if it was real, but the
scene always remains within the bounds of the narrative’s fiction. Thus, by revealing the
temporal boundaries that keep this narrative distinct from reality, this work opens up a time
of  intersubjectivity. Indeed, by incorporating in the fictional storyline the negotiation of a
role-play and next the betrayal of that contract, the narration succeeds in commenting on
its  own fictionality,  thereby making the fictional  violence feel  more real  than the  other
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fictional acts, without ever breaking out of its fictionality. The resulting metafiction creates a
fictitiously-coerced audience:  the scene  seems to  force the audience into  seeing non-
consensual  violence –  it  performs a  scene of  complementarity  –  while  simultaneously
providing the necessary tools to assist us in recognizing our own fictional coercion. In so
doing, this scene opens a time of reciprocity in which it actually surrenders into being with
the  spectator.  This  is  how  Transparent manages  to  remain  fictional/consensual,  while
simultaneously parasiting the logic of chrononormativity and, in so doing, creating spatial
and temporal conditions for new queer narratives and consensual practices to arise.
Pre-lude: [(not) Rules]
When we consent to a BDSM scene, we are agreeing to enter together into a temporality
during which gestures and words will  not convey their usual (normative) meaning. Our
relationship will thus function, for a limited time, in a different narrative from the usual one.
Such  a  game  is  a  parasite  to  heteronormative  practices  because  it  interrupts  their
hegemonic logic. We thus become agents who are able to establish temporalities whose
logics exceeds the normative one. The scene will last until one of us decides to end it. The
possibility of interrupting the alternative narrative at any time is precisely what makes this
a game; if someone takes this power away from the other, then the play and its narrative
will  cease  being  a  game  and  turn  into  force  instead.  We  could  say  that  consent  is
experienced as the feeling of being capable of refraining from whatever logic or narrative
one is exposed to; while coercion is the feeling that one is not able to do so. If one of us
feels coerced at any time and cannot communicate that within the logic of the game, it is
important that we use our safe word to stop the scene and return to equal grounds. My
safe word is time-out. What is yours?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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